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Abstract
In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield
Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order
to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the
misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes
its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as
well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which
is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium
is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed to find
the mean-field equilibrium. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence
of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show
that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared
to a baseline scheme in which the IoBT nodes are always transmitting. The results also show that the
proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared to the baseline.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), next-generation military networks will rely
more on machine intelligence and the information collected from the densely deployed IoT
devices [2]–[4]. The integration of military networks with the various IoT devices will potentially
achieve battlefield autonomy and increase considerably the efficiency of battlefield operations,
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2thus forming the so-called the Internet of battlefield Things (IoBT) [5]. However, due to its
adversarial nature, the IoBT is prone to a multitude of security attacks. One important attack on
IoBT is the misinformation attack [2] in which an adversary injects false information at each
IoBT device. Such misinformation can then be used by the adversary to manipulate the decisions
of the military commanders, in an effort to jeopardize the success of the military mission. Thus,
realizing the vision of a large-scale IoBT is largely contingent on developing novel security
mechanisms to combat misinformation propagation across the various IoBT nodes.
The dynamics of misinformation propagation have been recently modeled using epidemic
models for social networks in [6] and for mobile opportunistic networks such as those
encountered in the battlefield in [7]. Epidemic models are suitable for IoBT misinformation
propagation due to the presence of strong interactions among the densely deployed IoBT
devices. This dense nature of the IoBT implies that an IoBT device can get easily infected
with misinformation whenever it communicates with any one of its infected neighbors. Further,
epidemic models can capture systems with infinite number of nodes, which is suitable for the
large-scale IoBT systems.
Many existing works have considered the problem of controlling the spread of network
epidemics and studied the interaction between the network and the adversary using game-
theoretic approaches [8]–[17]. In [8]–[10], a noncooperative game is considered in which the
players are the network nodes whose goal is to choose a curing rate that minimizes the protection
cost as well as the infection costs at steady-state. In [11], several noncooperative games are
proposed for network epidemic control between a network operator and an attacker with the
goal of minimizing the infection cost. A zero-sum differential game is proposed in [12] and
[13] for network malware propagation in which the network operator controls the recovery rates
of the sensor nodes whereas an attacker chooses the infection rate that maximizes the infection
cost. The work in [12] particularly considers a wireless sensor network in which the network
operator controls the sleep rate of the sensor nodes in addition to the recovery rate in order to
limit the spread of infections. The authors in [14] propose a network formation game in which
the network nodes choose to construct links starting from an empty network in order to reach
a connected, steady-state network while minimizing the costs of infection. In [15] and [16],
the problem of controlling the network epidemic through vaccination is formulated as a zero-
determinant game where both the network administrator and the nodes are the players. In [17],
a mean-field game is proposed to study infection spread in a fully connected regular network.
3However, most of this prior art [8]–[17] models the network as either a fully connected graph or
as a k-regular graph. However, in an IoBT, the nodes have heterogeneous connectivty, and, thus,
there is a need to consider more suitable graph models that account for the IoBT heterogeneity.
Also, considering the network operator as the sole network player as done in [11]–[13] is not
suitable for the IoBT since it requires a centralized control over all of the IoBT nodes and
therefore significant time and control overheads, which is not tolerable in time-sensitive military
missions. Hence, distributed approaches are more favorable for the IoBT since the nodes must
instanteneously take control to limit misinformation propagation. Moreover, existing works, such
as in [8] and [9], that consider the network nodes as the players typically seek to maximize the
payoff when the system is at the steady state. Such approaches are not suitable for the problem
of misinformation propagation in IoBT. This is due to the fact that information propagation in
the IoBT is time sensitive. Thus, in order to maintain the successful operation of the IoBT, it is
critical to limit the spread of misinformation at each time instant and not only at the steady state.
In addition, choosing only the curing rate, as done by most of the existing works [8]–[17], is not
adequate to instanteneously limit the spread of misinformation. In fact, curing the nodes comes
at the expense of security costs. Thus, there is a need to implement cost-efficient actions that
can effectively limit the spread of misinformation. Here, it is also worth noting that, recently, a
number of works [18]–[21] have studied various IoBT security scenarios, however, these works
do not analyze the critical problem of misinformation spread.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel, comprehensive framework for thwarting the
spread of misinformation in a large-scale IoBT system. In particular, the proposed framework
will yield the following key contributions:
• We propose a novel approach to control misinformation propagation in the IoBT. In
particular, we propose a distributed approach in which each IoBT node decides whether
or not to accept the received information at each time instant, in order to to limit the
propagation of misinformation. Thus, our proposed approach, due to its distributed nature,
is scalable for a large-scale system such as the IoBT. Further, due to the heterogeneity of
the IoBT nodes in terms of connectivity, we model the IoBT as a random graph in which
the nodes have heterogeneous degrees that follow a predetermined distribution.
• We consider an epidemic model suitable for IoBT misinformation propagation that accounts
for the heterogeneous characteristics of the IoBT nodes to effectively identify misinforma-
tion. In particular, we consider an SELI epidemic model for the IoBT in which, in addition
4to the conventional susceptible (S) and infected (I) states of the nodes, we introduce latent
(L) and exposed (E) states to capture scenarios in which the IoBT nodes choose to perform
further processing to check the validity of any received information.
• We formulate the IoBT misinformation propagation problem as a finite-state mean-field
game [22] with multiclass agents [23] whose players are the IoBT nodes each of which
is seeking to determine its probability of accepting the received information. Mean-field
games [24] are suitable for our problem since they handle an infinite number of players
which is the case for a large scale IoBT. Further, the proposed framework of mean-field
games with multiclass agents can capture the presence of several types of populations where
agents belonging to the same type have similar characteristics. Thus, such games [23] are
suitable to model the heterogeneous characteristics of the IoBT nodes, unlike conventional
mean-field games [17] that assume all players to be similar. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior work that combines mean-field games with multiclass agents, as proposed
here.
• We consider a suitable metric for misinformation propagation known as the quality-of-
information (QoI) in the IoBT nodes’ payoff in addition to the infection cost. The QoI
of each node is defined as a function of the information received from its neighbors, the
integrity of the received information and the age of information.
• We extend the definition of the finite state mean-field equilibrium (MFE) that is defined
in [22] to the case of multiclass agents and propose an algorithm based on the forward
backward sweep method [29] to find the MFE. Then, we analyze the case of a finite IoBT
game and prove the convergence of the equilibrium of the finite game to the MFE. This
result, in turn, shows that the MFE is an effective approximation to a real-world IoBT
system with a large number of players.
• Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the
quality of information (QoI) compared to a baseline scheme in which the IoBT nodes are
always transmitting. Further, the proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected
nodes by 99% compared to the baseline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the system model. Section III
present the IoBT mean-field game. Section IV presents the finite IoBT game and the convergence
conditions of the finite game to the mean-field game. Section V presents the simulation results.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in section VI.
5II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Epidemic Model
Consider an IoBT network modeled by a random graph whose node degrees are distributed
according to a distribution P , with P (k) being the probability that an IoBT node has a degree
k. We let Kmax be the maximum degree in the IoBT system. The random graph is a realistic
model for a large-scale IoBT due to the heterogeneity in the connectivity of the IoBT nodes.
In fact, the IoBT network comprises IoBT devices that are locally connected to a cluster head,
and sinks/fusion centers that are connected to a multitude of cluster heads and various IoBT
devices. Further, by properly choosing the degree distribution P , the random graph can represent
a tree-like structure which commonly represents the topology of military networks [30]. In the
considered IoBT graph, nodes having degree k are classified into types within a set Hk and
distributed according to pk, where pk(i) is the probability that an node of degree k has type
i ∈ Hk. The existence of multiple types of nodes having a degree k stems from the heterogeneity
of the IoBT nodes that include simple sensors, wearables, vehicles, cameras, and robots or drones
that have different capabilities, characteristics, and roles.
In this IoBT, an attacker seeks to inject false information into the nodes in order to disrupt
the normal operations of the system. Let λik be the rate of injection of false information into
a node of degree k and type i. At any given time instant t, each IoBT node chooses to either
accept the received information and then transmit it or to doubt the integrity of this received
information. An IoBT node becomes infected once it accepts false information. When the IoBT
node chooses to doubt the information, it retains the information for some time for further
inspection. For instance, it can potentially run a classification machine learning algorithm to
decide whether to forward or discard the stored information. Finally, an infected node no longer
uses the misinformation when it becomes obsolete and, hence, this node goes back to being
susceptible to attacks. Thus, each one of the IoBT nodes can be in one of the following states:
• Susceptible (S): A node is said to be susceptible when it does not contain misinformation
but, simultaneously, it does not have strong security mechanisms to identify misinformation.
Hence, it can get infected with misinformation either when it accepts information forwarded
from an infected node or when the attacker succeeded in injecting misinformation directly
into the designated susceptible node.
• Exposed (E): A node is said to be exposed when it receives misinformation from its
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Fig. 1: State transition diagram of IoBT node of degree k and type i
neighbour. Yet, it is doubtful about the credibility of the received information, and, hence,
it does not immediately forward the information to its neighbour.
• Latent (L): A node is said to be latent when it receives true information. However, it still
decides to do further processing to inspect the received information.
• Infected (I): A node is said to be infected when it contains misinformation which it believes
it is correct, and, subsequently, it forwards the misinformation to its neighbour.
The SEI model and its variants have been been commonly adopted as a realistic model to
analyze misinformation propagation in networks (e.g. see [6], [7]). However, existing models do
not consider the case when the information which a node doubts is true, which is different from
the case when the node doubts misinformation. This is due to the fact that the probability of
accepting information after processing generally depends on whether the information is true or
not. Thus, we introduce the latent (L) state to represent tin which the IoBT nodes analyze true
information. Further, existing models such as those in [7] do not explicitly take into account the
delay incurred when a node decides to analyze its received information. In contrast, in our model,
we account for the processing delay in the latent and the exposed states by the probabilities of
residing in states E and L, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows the state transition diagram of each IoBT node of degree k and type i. When an
IoBT node of degree k and type i is susceptible and receives information, it will either accept the
information with probability αik(t) and become infected or it will doubt the information with
probability σik(t) = 1 − αik(t). The IoBT node receives misinformation either from infected
7neighbours or directly from the attacker. Based on [31], the probability with which a node with
degree k is infected by one of its neighbours is derived as kΘ(t) where Θ(t) is the probability
that a randomly chosen link is pointing to an infected node and is given by
Θ(t) =
∑
k kP (k)
∑
i∈Hk pk(i)Iik(t)
< k >
, (1)
where < k >=
∑
k kP (k) and Iik(t) is the proportion of infected devices of degree k and
type i. Thus, since the attacker directly infects the node with rate λik, the total infection rate is
αik(t)Rik(Θ(t)) where Rik(Θ(t)) = λik + kΘ(t). Similarly, when the IoBT node is susceptible
and receives true information, it becomes latent with probability σik(t)Lik(Θ(t)) or remains
susceptible with probability αik(t)Lik(Θ(t)), where Lik(Θ(t)) = (1 − λik)(1 − Θ(t))k is the
probability that an IoBT node does not receive misinformation at time t.
When an IoBT node is in the exposed state, it remains in this state with probability δik.
The probability δik corresponds to the delay incurred to judge the credibility of the obtained
information. Then, the node will accept the information with probability βEik and become infected,
or it will refuse the misinformation and return back to the susceptible state with probability γEik.
Similarly, when the node is in the latent state, it remains in this state in order to process the
information with probability δik, it accepts the information with probability βLik or rejects it with
probability γLik. When in the latent state, the IoBT node will return to the susceptible state whether
it decides to accept or reject the information (i.e. with probability βLik+γ
L
ik). The probabilities δik,
βEik, γ
E
ik, β
L
ik and γ
L
ik depend on the node’s capabilities (for example the strength of the machine
learning algorithm used) and its effectiveness in identifying the misinformation. Finally, an IoBT
node of degree k and type i discards the misinformation when it is no longer useful after some
time with probability νik.
Let mSik(t), m
E
ik(t), m
L
ik(t), and m
I
ik(t) be the proportions of IoBT nodes of degree k and type
i in states S, E, L, and I, respectively. Since IoBT networks typically have a massive number
of devices, we consider a mean-field epidemic model. Mean-field models provide a simple yet
effective representation of large and complex interacting system of agents. Mean-field models
mainly study decision making processes in which the number of agents tends to infinity, and
that the dynamics of agents of similar characteristics can be described by an aggregate behavior.
Further, in mean-field models since the number of agents tend to infinity, the influence of a
single agent on the overall system is negligible, yet the effect of all agents is considerable and
8approximated by their average effect. Thus, at the mean-field level, the state dynamics of IoBT
nodes of degree k and type i are governed by the following Kolmogorov differential equations:
∂mSik(t)
∂t
=−(1− α¯ik(t) + α¯ik(t)Rik(Θ(t))mSik(t) + (1− δik)γEikmEik + (1− δik)mLik + νikmIik, (2)
∂mEik(t)
∂t
= −(1− δik)mEik + (1− α¯ik(t))Rik(Θ(t))mSik(t), (3)
∂mLik(t)
∂t
= −(1− δik)mLik + (1− α¯ik(t))Lik(Θ(t))mSik(t), (4)
∂mIik(t)
∂t
= α¯ik(t)Rik(Θ(t))m
S
ik(t) + (1− δik)βEikmEik − νikmIik(t), (5)
where α¯Sik(t) is the aggregate rate of accepting information for all nodes with degree k and type
i when in the susceptible state. At time 0, all the nodes are susceptible, and, thus, mSik(0) = 1
and mIik(0) = m
E
ik(0) = m
L
ik(0) = 0, ∀i, k.
Each IoBT node of degree k and type i seeks to determine the probability αik(t) of accepting
the received information that minimizes its cost. Let xSik(t), x
E
ik(t), x
L
ik(t), and x
I
ik(t) be the
probabilities that the node of degree k and type i is in the S, E, L, and I states, respectively.
Based on the epidemic dynamics in (5), the state xik(t) = (xSik(t), x
E
ik(t), x
L
ik(t), x
I
ik(t)) of each
node is governed by the following differential equations:
∂xSik(t)
∂t
=−(1− α¯ik(t) + α¯ik(t)Rik(Θ(t))xSik(t) + (1− δik)γEikxEik + (1− δik)mLik + νikxIik, (6)
∂xEik(t)
∂t
= −(1− δik)xEik + (1− α¯ik(t))Rik(Θ(t))xSik(t), (7)
∂xLik(t)
∂t
= −(1− δik)xLik + (1− α¯ik(t))Lik(Θ(t))xSik(t), (8)
∂xIik(t)
∂t
= α¯ik(t)Rik(Θ(t))x
S
ik(t) + (1− δik)βEikxEik − νikxIik(t). (9)
B. Cost Functions
The payoff of each IoBT node is expressed in terms of the quality of its information and
the cost of infection. The QoI is a metric that has been widely used to assess the information
generated by sensors networks, in general, and military networks as discussed in particular [32]
and [33]. It is mainly a function of the precision of the sensing device, the integrity, and the
age of information. Further, in [34], the authors consider the QoI of the information received by
each node as an increasing function of the number of its neighbors. However, the integrity of the
information is not considered. In contrast, in our IoBT problem, we define the QoI Qik(t) to be
a joint function of the degree of the node, the information integrity, and the age of information.
9Consequently, the QoI of a given IoBT node of degree k and type i will be given by
Qik(t) = Vik(t)− κδik, (10)
where δik is the delay of processing the information when in the latent or exposed state, κ is
a normalization constant, Vik(t) is an increasing linear function of the number of transmitting
noninfected links, a decreasing linear function in the number of infected links if the node accepts
the information, and Vik(t) = 0 otherwise. Thus, the function Vik(t) captures the integrity of
the information generated at each node by accounting for infected links. When the node is not
infected, it is transmitting only when in the S state. For a node with degree k and type i, let n1 and
n2 be the number of links pointing to a node in states I and S, respectively. The function Vik(t)
also captures the integrity of the information generated by the node itself. Thus, this function
Vik(t) is given by Vik(t) = n2 − n1 − yik(t) + (1 − yik(t)) = n2 − n1 − yik(t) + (1 − yik(t)),
where yik(t) indicates if the attacker successfully injects false information. Next, we define η(t)
as the probability that a randomly chosen link is pointing to a susceptible node. η(t) will then
be given by:
η(t) =
∑
k kP (k)
∑
i∈Hk pk(i)m
S
ik(t)
< k >
. (11)
Thus, the number of links pointing to nodes in I, S, and either in L or E states follows a
multinomial distribution with parameters Θ(t), η(t), and 1−Θ(t)− η(t).
Consequently, when the node is susceptible and accepts true information, the expected QoI is
V¯ Tik (η(t)) = kη(t)+1. Otherwise, when a susceptible node accepts misinformation, the expected
value of V Mik (t) given that the node receives misinformation and γ(t) = (Θ(t), η(t)) will be
V¯ Mik (γ(t)) =
FMik (γ(t))
1− Lik(Θ(t)) , (12)
where
F¯Mik (γ(t)) =
k∑
n1=0
k−n1∑
n2=0
(
λik(n2 − n1 − 1) +
k∑
n1=0
k−n1∑
n2=0
(1− λik)(n2 − n1)−
k∑
n2=0
(1− λik)(n2)
)
× k!
n1!n2!(k − n1 − n2)! ×Θ(t)
n1η(t)n2(1−Θ(t)− η(t))k−n1−n2
= kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t). (13)
Whenever a given IoBT node is in the susceptible state and suspects its information to
be modified by the attacker, this node becomes exposed, and the QoI in this case will be
V¯ Iik(t)−δik(t) if it accepts the information with probability βEik(t), where Vik(t) is given by (13).
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Otherwise, if it does not accept the information, the QoI will be 0.
When the node is in the susceptible state and doubts information which is true, the QoI is
kη(t) + 1− δik if it accepts the information with probability βLik. Thus, the expected QoI given
that the node is in the susceptible state with respect to αik(t) will be given by
Eαik(t)[Qik(t)] = αik(t)(Lik(Θ(t))(kη(t) + 1) + αik(t)(kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t))
+σik(t)Lik(Θ(t))(β
L
ik(t)(kη(t) + 1− κδik))
+σik(t)(β
E
ik(kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t)− κδik(1− Lik(Θ(t))).(14)
For a node of degree k and type i, the cost cik of infection depends on its importance and
functionality in the IoBT. For example, the cost of infection of a fusion center will be higher
than that of a cluster head, and the cost of infection of a drone is higher than that of a simple
sensor. When the node is in the S state, the cost is expressed as the square of the difference
between the expected QoI and a target value QT . Thus, the cost of a node of degree k and type
i at time t will be
vik(xik, αik(t),γ(t)) = x
S
ik(t)(Eαik(t)[Q¯ik(γ(t))]−QT )2 + xIik(t)cik (15)
The objective of each IoBT node of degree k and type i is to minimize its cost over [0, T ], i.e.,
each IoBT node will seek to solve the following optimization problem:
min
αik(t)
∫ T
t=0
vik(xik, αik(t),γ(t)) s.t. αik(t) ∈ [0, 1]2, (16)
subject to the state constraints in (6)-(9) and with vik(T ) = 0. As shown in (6)-(9) and (15),
the state evolution of each IoBT node as well its cost function depend on Θ(t) and η(t) and
therefore on the mean-field vector mik(t) = (mlik(t))l∈S for all (i, k). Further, the dynamics of
the IoBT nodes and their cost functons depend on their degree and their type. Thus, the problem
is formulated using game theory [25], [26]. In particular, we use as a finite state mean-field
game [22] with multiclass agents [23] as explained next.
III. IOBT MEAN-FIELD GAME WITH MULTICLASS AGENTS
A. Game Formulation
Our problem is formulated as a finite state, mean-field game [22] with multiclass agents [23]
where the players are the IoBT nodes, and each IoBT node can be in a state belonging to the
set S = {S,E, L, I}. IoBT nodes having the same degree k and type i belong to class (i, k).
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We denote by C the set of all classes. The proportion mlik of IoBT nodes of class (i, k) in each
state l evolves according to (2)-(5).
We fix a reference player of class (i, k). The state evolution of the reference player is given by
(6)-(9). Thus, the state evolution of the reference player depends on Θ(t) and η(t) and therefore
on mik(t) for all (i, k) as well as its control which is the probability αik(t). Each IoBT node
has full knowledge of the state distribution mik(t) of the remaining nodes for all classes in C.
The cost of each IoBT node of class (i, k) is given by (15). The objective of each IoBT node
of class (i, k) is to find the optimal probability αik(t) that minimizes its cost according to (16).
In order to find the minimum cost, the reference player solves a continuous-time finite-state
Markov decision process with finite horizon [27] defined by the set of states S. In our game,
since each IoBT node chooses the probability αik(t) when in the S state, then the action sets for
each state will be given by: AS = [0, 1] and AI = AE = AL = φ. The running costs for each
state l are given by vik(S,γ(t), αik(t)) = (Eαik(t)[Q¯ik(γ(t))]−QT )2, vik(E) = vik(L) = 0, and
vik(I) = cik. Let ulik(t) =
∫ T
t
vik(l(s),γ(s), α
j
ik(s))ds be the total cost starting from time t when
in state l where l(s) is the state at time s and αjik(s) is the action taken when in state j at time
s. Then, for a given γ(t), the reference player uses the so-called Hamilton Jacobi (HJ) equations
[22] to find the minimum cost. The HJ equations are defined as −∂ulik
∂t
= h(∆luik,γ(t), l), for
every state l ∈ S where uik = (ulik)l∈S , ∆luik = (ujik − ulik)j∈S , and
h(∆luik,γ(t), l) = min
αlik(t)
vik(l,γ(t), α
l
ik(t)) +
∑
j∈S
Giklj (α
l
ik(t),Θ(t))(u
j
ik − ulik), (17)
where Giklj is the transition rate from state l to j. For our problem, the HJ equations are specifically
given by
−∂u
S
ik
∂t
= min
αik(t)
vik(S,γ(t), α
ST
ik (t)) + (1− αik)Rik(Θ(t))(uEik − uSik)
+(1− αik)Lik(Θ(t))(uLik − uSik) + αik(t)Rik(Θ(t))(uIik − uSTik ), (18)
−∂u
E
ik
∂t
= (1− δik)βEik(uIik − uEik) + (1− δik)γEik(uSik − uEik), (19)
−∂u
L
ik
∂t
= (1− δik)(uSik − uLik), (20)
−∂u
I
ik
∂t
= cik + νik(u
S
ik − uIik), (21)
with uSik(T ) = u
E
ik(T ) = u
L
ik(T ) = u
I
ik(T ) = 0. Thus, αik(t) that minimizes the Hamiltonian
h(∆Suik,γ(t), S) is the optimal value. We denote by αik(∆Suik,γ(t)) the optimal value. Due
to the dependence of the optimal value on the mean-field dynamics through γ(t), the optimal
value αik(∆Suik,γ(t)) is called the best response with respect to γ(t). The following remark
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presents the best response αik(∆Suik,γ(t)) of a player of class (i, k) for γ(t).
Remark 1. For a given γ(t), the best response αik(∆luik,γ(t)) of a player of class (i, k) is
αik(∆luik,γ(t)) =

0, if gik(∆luik,γ(t)) < 0,
gik(∆Suik,γ(t)), if 0 < gik(∆luik,γ(t)) < 1,
1, otherwise,
(22)
where
gik(∆luik,γ(t)) =
Rik(Θ(t))(u
E
ik − uSik) + Lik(Θ(t))(uLik − uSik)−Rik(Θ(t))(uIik − uSik) + 2A1(QT −A2)
2A21
,
A1 = (Lik(Θ(t))(kη(t) + 1) + (kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t))) + Lik(Θ(t))(βLik(t)(kη(t) + 1− κδik))
−(βEik(kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t)− κδik(1− Lik(Θ(t))),
A2 = +Lik(Θ(t))(β
L
ik(t)(kη(t) + 1− κδik)) + (1− Lik(Θ(t)))(βEik(kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik − (1− λik)kη(t)− κδik)).
The result directly follows by equating the partial derivative of the right-hand side of (18)
with respect to αik(t). Given the best response in (22), next, we characterize the MFE for our
IoBT game .
B. Mean-Field Equilibrium
The MFE occurs when the best response αik(∆Suik,γ(t)) of a player belonging to class (i, k)
is the same as the strategy α¯ik of the population belonging to class (i, k), for all (i, k). Thus, the
MFE will be the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equations in (18)-(21), and the Kolomogrov
equations in (2)-(5) with α¯ik(t) = αik(∆Suik,γ(t)), uSik(T ) = u
E
ik(T ) = u
L
ik(T ) = u
I
ik(T ) = 0
and mSik(0) = 1, m
L
ik(0) = m
E
ik(0) = m
I
ik(0) = 0 ∀i, k. For our IoBT mean-field game, the MFE
exists. The proof follows from [22, Proposition 4]. Even though existence follows from [22],
it is difficult to characterize analytically the MFE for our IoBT game. Further, our game does
not satisfy the standard conditions for uniqueness for mean-field games (see [22] and [28]). In
particular, the Hamiltonian h(∆Suik,γ(t), l) is not strongly convex in ∆suik. Thus, due to the
aformentioned reasons, it is difficult to analyze analytically the uniqueness of our game.
In (2)-(5), the mean-field equations are subject to initial conditions. Thus, in order to find the
MFE, we propose an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method [29], which has
been widely used to solve optimal control problems with initial conditions. The details of the
proposed forward backward sweep as tailored to the IoBT are given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 first solves the mean-field equations using a finite difference method and using
the initial guess of the optimal acceptance probability αik. Next, using the mean-field solution
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Algorithm 1: Forward Backward Sweep Algorithm for the IoBT mean-field Game
1 Input: , T , νik, λik for all (i, k)
2 Output: The equilibrium acceptance probabilities α∗ik = (α
∗
ik(t))t∈[0,T ] for all (i, k)
3 Initialize: for all t ∈ [0, T ], α∗ik(t) = αik,0, iter = 0
4 repeat
5 α∗ik,old ← α∗ik
6 Compute m∗ik(t) using the mean-field equations (2)-(5) with α¯ik(t) = αik,old(t) ∀(i, k), t ∈ [0, t]
(forward sweep)
7 Using m∗ik(t), (4), and (11), compute γ
∗(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
8 Using γ∗(t)t∈[0,T ] , compute α∗ik using the Hamilton Jacobi equations (18)-(21) (backward sweep)
iter = iter + 1
9 until ||α∗ik −α∗ik,old|| ≤  or iter > Imax;
(m∗ik(t))t∈[0,T ], the probabilities Θ
∗(t) and η∗(t) are computed according to (4) and (11),
respectively. Algorithm 1 then computes the optimal acceptance probability αik based on the
HJ equations and on the the computed (Θ∗(t))t∈[0,T ] and (η∗(t))t∈[0,T ], using a finite difference
method. The newly computed αik are consequently used to recompute the mean-field solution.
The process is repeated until convergence, or if the maximum number of iterations Imax is
reached, since the forward backward sweep algorithm is not guaranteed to converge, in general.
In practice, each IoBT node will run Algorithm 1 in order to determine its optimal probability
of accepting information α∗ik(t) over the considered interval [0, T ]. It is assumed that the IoBT
nodes acquire information about the characteristics (such as the processing delay δik and the
probabilities βEik and β
L
ik) of IoBT nodes belonging to other classes through an initial phase
in which the fusion center/ base station broadcasts the information. For each subsequent time
duration, each IoBT node will run Algorithm 1 and use, as the initial mean-field values, the
mean-field values ml∗ik(T ) at time T from the previous run. The process will be repeated until
the end of the military operation.
While the mean-field formulation provides a tractable approach to analyze a massive IoBT
system, it assumes that the number of IoBT devices to be infinite. In practice, the IoBT will
have a large, but finite number of devices. As such, in the next section, we analyze an IoBT
having a large, but finite number of nodes. The finite IoBT case is a better fit to a real-world
IoBT and can account for all potential network sizes. However, computing the equilibria for
the finite case is computationaly expensive as discussed next, and therefore is not suitable to be
used by the IoBT nodes to determine the optimal strategies in real-time. Thus, the complexity of
determining the equilibria of the finite IoBT makes the proposed mean-field approach in Section
II more suitable to determine the optimal stategies of the IoBT nodes.
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IV. ON THE TRACTABILITY OF THE FINITE IOBT CASE
A. Game Formulation
We now consider the game when the IoBT network is composed of a finite number of nodes
N + 1, each of which can be in any one of the states in S . The number of background nodes,
i.e. any node other than the reference player, belonging to class (i, k) is Nik with the assumption
that limN→∞ NikN = piik where piik = P (k)pk(i) is the distribution of the players in the previously
studied infinite IoBT case.
Thus, at any time t, the number of background nodes nik(t) = (n
j
ik(t))j∈S of class (i, k) in
each state evolves according to a Markov chain. Hence, the probability that a link is infected in
the finite IoBT is ΘN(t) =
∑
k k
∑
i∈Hk
nIik(t)
N
Similarly, the probability of a randomly chosen
link pointing to a susceptible node is ηN(t) =
∑
k k
∑
i∈Hk
nSik(t)
N
. We define the vector n(t) =
(nik(t))(i,k)∈C . The state evolution of a background node belonging to class (i, k) is
P(sik(t+ h) = j|sik(t) = l) = Gljik(ΘN(t), α¯lik(t))h+ o(h), (23)
where o(h) → 0 as h → ∞, Gljik is the transition rate from state j to state l and has the
same expression as the infinite case with the variable Θ(t) replaced by ΘN(t), and α¯Nik(t) is
the acceptance probability of the background nodes of class (i, k). Thus, in our problem, Gljik
depends only on ΘN(t) and α¯Nik(t) when it is in the S state. Subsequently, G
lj
ik(ΘN(t), α¯ik(t)) is
replaced by Gljik(n(t), α¯
N
ik(t)) as ΘN(t) is a function of n
I
ik(t) ∀(i, k) ∈ C. Thus, the evolution of
the number of nodes nik(t) will affect the transition rate G
lj
ik. The state evolution of the reference
node is also given by (23) but with α¯Nik(t) replaced by α
N
ik(t). Further, the state transitional rates
of the different nodes are independent conditioned on n(t) and l(t), where l(t) is the state of
the reference node. Thus, the evolution of nik(t) is given by P(nik(t+ h) = nik + ejl|nik(t) =
nik,n(t) = n, s(t) = s) = η
s
ik(j, l,n)h + o(h) where ejl = ej − el, ej is the jth vector of the
canonical basis of R|S|, and
ρsik(l, j,n) =
n
l
ikG
lj
ik(n
′, α¯Nik(t)), if l = S,
nlikG
lj
ik, otherwise,
(24)
where n′ = n+ eiksl if (i, k) = (i
′, k′) where (i′, k′) is the class of the reference player, n+ eiksl
is the same as n but with nik replaced by nik + esl. n′ = n − eikl if (i, k) 6= (i′, k′) where
n− eikl is the same as n but with nik replaced by nik − el.
The reference node has full knowledge of the evolution of nik(t) = (n
j
ik(t))j∈S of the
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background nodes for all (i, k) ∈ C. Thus, the reference IoBT node of class (i, k) starting from
state l seeks to find the acceptance probabilities αN,lik (t) (l ∈ {SN , ST}) that minimizes its total
expected cost uN,n,lik = minαNik(t) E
∫ T
0
vik(j(s),γ
N(s), αjik(s))ds where γ
N(s) = (ΘN(s), ηN(s))
and vik(j(s),γN(s), α
j
ik(s)) has the same expression as the infinite case . We denote by u
N,n,l
ik (t)
the total expected cost starting from time t and when in state l conditioned on n(t) = n. The
HJ equation for this case will be given by [22]
−du
N,n,l
ik
dt
=
∑
r,v
ρlik(v, r,n)(u
N,n+eikvr,l
ik − uN,n,lik ) + h(∆luN,nik ,γN (t), l), (25)
with uN,n,lik (T ) = 0 for all l ∈ S and (i, k) ∈ C. where ∆luN,nik = (uN,n,jik − uN,n,lik )j∈S and
h(∆lu
N,n
ik ,γN(t), l) has the same expression as in (17).
In the finite IoBT game, the equilibrium also occurs when αNik(t) = α¯
N
ik(t) ∀ (i, k). It can
be easily shown that the equilibrium exists using a similar argument as in [22]. However,
due to the dependence of uN,n,lik on n in (25), the number of possible evaluations of u
N,n,l
ik
grows exponentially with T according to (25). Hence, computing uN,n,lik for the finite IoBT is
computationally expensive, unlike in the proposed mean-field approach where the computational
complexity of computing ulik for all l ∈ S is only linear in T according to (18)-(22). Thus,
the mean-field approach is computationally more favourable to be used in terms of to find the
optimal strategies of the IoBT nodes. However, in order to ensure that the mean-field game
yields a performance comparable to the finite IoBT game for large number of nodes, we discuss
the convergence of the cost and distribution functions of the finite IoBT case to the mean-field
case, as N goes to infinity.
B. Convergence Conditions of the Finite IoBT Game
We now extend the convergence results of the finite state mean-field games in [22] to the case
of multiclass agents and when the transitional probability is a function of the control as well as
the mean-field. We show the conditions under which the cost and distribution functions of the
N + 1 player game converges uniformly to corresponding functions in the mean-field game, in
order to ensure that the mean-field IoBT game yields a performance comparable to the finite
IoBT game. Our proof relies on the following useful property from [22, Proposition 7] which
holds for the solution uN,n,lik to our HJ equations in (25).
Remark 2. Let uN,n,lik (t) be the solution of (25). Then, there exists C > 0 and T ∗ > 0 such that
for 0 < T < T ∗,
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max
rv
||uN,n+ervik ,lik (t)− uN,n,lik (t)|| ≤
2C
N
, (26)
where the norm ||.|| used is the ∞ norm.
Also, we rely on the following properties of our game.
Proposition 1. The studied IoBT game exhibits the following properties:
1) The transitional rate Gjlik(αik(t),Θ(t)) is a Lipchitz function of αik(t) for all i, k.
2) The best response α∗ik(∆Suik,γ(t)) is Lipschitz in ∆luik, Θ(t), η(t), and mik(t) ∀ (i, k) ∈
C provided that the immediate cost vik is strongly convex in αik.
3) The transitional rate Gjlik(α
∗
ik,Θ(t)) is Lipchitz in ∆ju and Θ(t).
4) The immediate cost vik and its derivative ∇αikvik is Lipchitz in Θ(t) and η(t).
5) The function h(∆Suik,γ(t), l) is Lipchitz in ∆lu, Θ(t), and η(t).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using the results of Proposition 1, we can now present the convergence results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let T ∗ be defined as in Remark 2. There exists a constant C independent of N ,
for which, if T < T ∗, satisfies µ = TC < 1 then∑
i,k
V Nik (t) +W
N
ik (t) ≤
C
1− µ
1
Nmax
, (27)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], where Nmax = max(r,v)∈C Nrv, WNik (t) = E
[
||uik(t) − uN,nik (t)||2
]
, V Nik (t) =
E(||nik(t)
Nik
−mik(t)||)2, mik(t) and uik(t) are the mean-field and cost functions at the MFE,
nik(t) and u
N,n
ik (t) are the equilibrium distribution and cost value of N + 1 player game .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Define T ∗ defined as done in Remark 2, then, there exists C1 such that
WNik (t) ≤
C1
N
+ C1E
∫ T
t
(
WNik (s) +
∑
(r,v)∈C
V Nrv (s)
)
ds. (28)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Define T ∗ as done in Remark 2, then, there exists C2 such that
V Nik (t) ≤ C2E
∫ t
0
(V Nik (s) +W
N
ik (s) + V
N
yz (s))ds+
C2
Nmax
, (29)
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where (y, z) = arg max(r,v) Vrv(t) and Nmax = max(r,v)∈C Nrv.
Proof. See Appendix C.
By adding (28) and (29) for all (i, k), we have∑
ik
WNik (t) +
∑
ik
V Nik (t) ≤ C1E
∫ t
0
∑
ik
(
WNik (s) +
∑
rv
V Nrv (s)
)
+
C1|C|
N
ds
+C2E
∫ T
t
∑
ik
(
WNik (s) + V
N
ik (s) + V
N
yz (s)
)
+
C2|C|
Nmax
,
≤ C¯E
∫ T
0
∑
ik
V Nik (s) +W
N
ik (s) +
C¯
Nmax
, (30)
where C¯ = max{C1|C|, C2 + 1, C2|C|}.
Let WNik + V
N
ik = max0≤t≤T W
N
ik (t) + V
N
ik (t). Then,∑
ik
WNik (t) + V
N
ik (t) ≤
∑
ik
WNik + V
N
ik ≤ C¯T
∑
ik
WNik + V
N
ik +
C¯
Nmax
≤ C¯
(1− µ)Nmax , (31)
where µ = C¯T . Thus, the value function and the proportion of nodes converges uniformly in
distribution to the meanfield case. Hence, the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an  equilibrium
for the finite game as demonstrated in [17].
Thus in this section, we have demonstrated that finding the equilibrium for the finite game has
exponential complexity in the number of IoBT nodes. However, we have also show that, under
mild conditions, the finite game will converge to the mean-field game as N goes to infinity.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider an IoBT where the values of the degree of the nodes k ∈
{1, 10, 15, 20}. The degree distribution is P (k = 1) = 0.4, P (k = 10) = 0.3, P (k = 15) = 0.2,
and P (k = 20) = 0.1. The distribution is chosen such that the proportion of nodes decreases
with the degree, which represents a typical hierarchical IoBT structure. We consider one type of
device of each degree. Thus, nodes of degree 1 correspond to simple sensors. Nodes of degrees
10 and 15 correspond to cluster heads, and nodes of degree 15 correspond to local sinks. The
infection costs are set to: c1 = 1, c10 = 10, c15 = 20, and c20 = 30. The cost values are chosen
depending on the importance of the nodes. For a node of degree k, the target QoI QT = k. The
attacker’s infection rate for all nodes is set to be 0.2. The time period T is set to be 0.9 seconds.
The delays of the E and L states are set to be δ1 = 0, δ10 = 0.4, δ15 = 0.3, and δ20 = 0.3. The
acceptance probabilities of the E state are set to βE1 = 0.5, β
E
10 = 0.3, β
E
15 = 0.2, and β
E
20 = 0.1.
The acceptance probabilities when in L state are set to βL1 = 0.5, β
L
10 = 0.6, β
L
15 = 0.7, and
βL20 = 0.8. The parameters are chosen to reflect the computational capabilities of the different
18
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time (ms)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
a
c
c
e
p
ti
n
g
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n Mean-field equilibrium, k = 1
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 10
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 15
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20
Fig. 2: The acceptance probability as a function of time.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time (ms)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 in
fe
ct
ed
 n
od
es
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 1
Baseline, k = 1
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 10
Baseline, k = 10
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 15
Baseline, k = 15
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20
Baseline, k = 20
Fig. 3: Evolution of the proportion of infected nodes over time.
IoBT nodes. For example, βE1 = β
L
1 = 0.5 is chosen for simple sensors that can not identify
the misinformation. Thus, such sensors accept/reject the information with probability 0.5, and,
hence, the processing delay δ1 is set to 0. For comparison, we consider a baseline in which the
nodes always transmit with probability one. For the considered simulation values, we compute
the equilibrium acceptance probability using Algorithm 1. We also compute the proportion of
infected nodes, the probability of an infected link, and the QoI for both the baseline and the
MFE. For all considered values, Algorithm 1 converges in at most 16 iterations. Also, Algorithm
1 always yields the same solution for any initial guess of the acceptance probabilities.
Fig. 2 shows the MFE acceptance probability α versus time for the considered values of degree
k. First, when k = 1, the acceptance probability is zero for the entire time duration, since the
processing delay δ1 is 0. Thus, a node of degree 1 can reduce the spread of misinformation by
accepting the information with probability βE1 = 0.5 instead of 1. When k = 10, the acceptance
probability is 0 for t ≤ 0.83 seconds. Then, it increases with time until it reaches 0.01 at t = 0.9,
as the spread of misinformation ceases in the IoBT. When k = 15, 20, the acceptance probability
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Fig. 4: Evolution of the probability of an infected link over time.
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Fig. 5: Time evolution of the QoI resulting from the proposed MFE and the baseline.
varies similar to the case when k = 10.
Fig. 3 shows how the proportion of infected nodes changes over time for for the considered
values of degree k and for both the baseline as well as the MFE. Using the baseline and for the
considered degree values, the proportion of infected nodes increases with time until it reaches
0.45, 0.95, 0.97, and 0.98 at t = 0.9 for k = 1, 10, 15, and 20, respectively. From Fig. 3 we can
also see that, using the MFE and for all considered degree values, the proportion of infected
nodes increases with time until it reaches 0.0212, 0.009, 0.0078, and 0.0065 at t = 0.9 for
k = 1, 10, 15, and 20, respectively. Thus, Fig. 3 shows that, for all considered degree values, the
proportion of infected nodes using the MFE is maintained significantly lower than the baseline
case. The considerable decrease in the the proportion of infected nodes is due to two reasons 1)
At the MFE, the acceptance probabilities of information for all nodes when in the S is zero for a
considerable time duration as shown in Fig. 2 2) The acceptance probabilities of misinformation
when in the E are low, which limits the spread of misinformation. The decrease in the proportion
of infected nodes reaches up to 99% when k = 15.
20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time (ms)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
cc
ep
tin
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.1
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.3
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.5
Fig. 6: Time evolution of the acceptance probability of nodes with degree 20 for different values
of βE20.
In Fig. 4, we show the probability of an infected link Θ over time for both the baseline and
the MFE. From this figure, we can see that, for the baseline, Θ increases with time until it
reaches 0.94 at t = 0.9 seconds. This is due to the fact that the proportion of infected nodes
increases with time using the baseline, for all considered degree values as shown in Fig. 3. For
the MFE, from Fig. 4 we can see that Θ increases with time until it reaches 0.0085 at t = 0.9
seconds. The decrease in Θ using the MFE reaches up to 99% compared to the baseline. Thus,
Fig. 4 shows the effectiveness of our proposed scheme in limiting the spread of misinformation.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the QoI over time for both the baseline and the MFE for degree
values k = 15 and 20, respectively. First when k = 15 and using the baseline, the QoI will
be 16 at t = 0. Then, the QoI decreases until it reaches −12.75 at t = 0.9 sec. The decrease
in the QoI is due to the increase in the probability Θ as shown in Fig. 4. When k = 15 and
using the MFE, the QoI is 6 at t = 0, since initially all nodes are susceptible and the acceptance
probability is zero as shown in Fig. 2. Then, the QoI decreases with time until it reaches 1.628
at t = 0.9 seconds. The decrease in the QoI is mainly due to the increase in the probability
Θ with time, as shown in Fig. 4. When k = 20 , the QoI resulting from the baseline is 21 at
t = 0. Then, the QoI decreases with time until it reaches −17 at t = 0.9. When k = 20 , the
QoI resulting from the proposed MFE is 9.8 at t = 0. As t increases, the QoI decreases until
it reaches 3.64. The decrease in the QoI when k = 20 for the baseline and the MFE is due to
the same aformentioned reasons for the case when k = 15. Thus, the proposed MFE approach
achieves a 1.2-fold increase in the value of the QoI compared to the value of the baseline, at
t = 0.9 and when k = 20.
Fig. 6 shows the MFE probability of accepting information by IoBT nodes with degree 20
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Fig. 7: Time evolution of the probability Θ(t) for different values of βE20.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time (ms)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q
u
a
lit
y 
o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.1
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.3
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
 E
20
 = 0.5
Baseline
Fig. 8: Time evolution of the QoI of nodes with degree 20 for different values of βE20.
over time for k = 20 and when the value of the βE20 is 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5. When β
E
20 = 0.1,
the acceptance probability is zero for t ≤ 0.56, respectively. Then, the acceptance probability
increases with time until it reaches 0.1 at t = 0.9 seconds. When the value of βE20 = 0.3, 0.5,
the acceptance probability is zero for the entire duration. Thus, Fig. 6 shows that the acceptance
probability decreases as the node has higher capability to identify the misinformation.
Fig. 7 shows the probability Θ of a link pointing to an infected node over time for k = 20 and
when the value of the probability βE20 is 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5, respectively. For the three considered
values of βE20, the probability Θ increases with time. From Fig. 7, we can see that, when β
E
20 = 0.1,
the probability Θ increases until it reaches 0.0085 at t = 0.9. Meanwhile, for βE20 = 0.3 and 0.5,
the probability Θ reaches 0.01 and 0.013, respectively at t = 0.9 seconds. As for the baseline,
the probability Θ is not affected by βE4 since the nodes do not reach the E or L states. Thus,
Θ(t) is the same as the one shown in Fig. 4. Thus, the MFE shows a considerable decrease in
Θ even in the case when the nodes having degree k = 20 cannot identify the misinformation
(i.e. when βE20 = 0.5). In this case, the decrease in Θ is 97% compared to the baseline. Further,
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Fig. 9: Time evolution of the acceptance probability of nodes with degree 20 for different values
of δ4.Fig. 7 clearly demonstrates that the spread of misinformation becomes more limited when the
IoBT nodes have a higher capability to identify misinformation.
In Fig. 8, we plot the evolution of the QoI over time, for k = 20 for the three values of βE20: 0.1,
0.3, and 0.5. Fig. 8 shows that, for βE20 = 0.1, the QoI is the same as in Fig. 5. However, when
βE20 = 0.3, the QoI decreases with time until it reaches 2.7 at t = 0.9 seconds. When β
E
20 = 0.5,
the QoI decreases with time until it reaches 2.37 at t = 0.9 seconds. Using the baseline, the
QoI is not affected by βE4 . Thus, as demonstrated earlier in Fig. 4, the QoI decreases until it
reaches −17 at t = 0.9. Fig. 8 further shows that for t ≤ 0.57, the QoI increases with βE20 due
to the low value of the probability Θ. Thus, a higher value of βE20 will result in a higher QoI.
For t ≤ 0.57, the QoI decreases with βE20 since, in the considered time duration, Θ increases at
a faster rate as shown in Fig. 7. Also, Fig. 8 shows the improvement in the QoI compared to
the baseline even when the nodes of degree k = 20 are not able to identify the misinformation.
In this case, the improvement in the QoI reaches up to 99% when βE20 = 0.1 and at t = 0.9 sec.
Fig. 9 shows the MFE probability of accepting information by IoBT nodes with degree 20 over
time for k = 20 and when the value of the delay δ20 is 0.3, 0.5, and 0.9. When δ20 = 0.3, 0.5,
the acceptance probability is zero for t ≤ 0.3 and t ≤ 0.56, respectively. Then, the acceptance
probability increases with time until it reaches 0.1 and 0.1846, respectively. When the value of
δ20 = 0.9, the acceptance probability is zero at t = 0. Then, it increases with time until it reaches
0.3 at t = 0.9. Fig. 9 shows that, at MFE, the acceptance probability increases with the delay
δ20 in order to prevent the QoI from deteriorating due to the age of information.
Fig. 10 shows the probability Θ of a link pointing to an infected node versus time for k = 20
and when the value of the delay δ20 is 0.3, 0.5, and 0.9. For the three considered values of
δ20, Fig. 10 shows that the probability Θ increases with time. When δ20 = 0.3 and t = 0, the
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Fig. 10: Time evolution of Θ(t) of nodes with degree 20 for different values of δ20.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Time (ms)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q
u
a
lit
y 
o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
20
 = 0.3
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
20
 = 0.5
Mean-field equilibrium, k = 20, 
20
 = 0.9
Baseline
Fig. 11: Time evolution of QoI of nodes with degree 20 for different values of δ20.
probability Θ is 0. Then, it increases with time until it reaches 0.0085 at t = 0.9 seconds. When
δ4 = 0.5, the probability Θ increases with time until it reaches 0.01 at t = 0.9 . Similarly, when
δ20 = 0.9, the probability Θ reaches 0.015 at t = 0.9. Also, as shown in Fig. 10 the probability
Θ increases with an increase in δ20. The increase in Θ is due to the fact that the acceptance
probability increases with δ20, as shown in Fig. 9. For the baseline, the probability Θ is not
affected with change in δ20 since the nodes do not enter the E or L states. Thus, Θ(t) is the
same as the one shown in Fig. 4. Thus, Fig. 10 confirms that the proposed MFE approach can
achieve a significant decrease in the probability Θ compared to the baseline, reaching up to 99%
when δ20 = 0.3 and at t = 0.9 seconds.
Fig. 11 shows how the QoI resulting from the MFE and the baseline will vary over time, for
k = 20, and for δ20 = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.9 for both the MFE and the baseline. When δ4 = 0.3
and for the MFE, the QoI is 10 at t = 0. Then, as time increases, the QoI decreases until it
reaches 3.64 at t = 0.9 seconds. When δ20 = 0.5, 0.9, the evolution of QoI is similar to the
case when δ20 = 0.3 and the minium value of QoI is 2.15 and 0.6, respectively at t = 0.9.
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Fig. 12: Time evolution of the probability Θ(t) for the IoBT mean-field game and the finite
IoBT game.
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Fig. 13: Time evolution of the QoI for the IoBT mean-field game and the finite IoBT game.
Using the baseline, the QoI is not affected with δ20. Hence as demonstrated earlier in Figs. 5
and 8, the QoI decreases with time until it reaches −17 at t = 0.9. Thus, Fig. 11 shows that
the QoI deteriorates with an increase in the information processing delay, due to the increase
in the probability Θ as shown in Fig. 10. Nonetheless, the MFE maintains a significant gain in
the QoI compared to the baseline even with high information processing delays. In particular,
the MFE achieves a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information when δ4 = 0.3 and t = 0.9
compared to the baseline.
Next, for the considered simulation values, we consider for the finite IoBT case when N =
10, 000 and compute, using Algorithm 1 tailored to the finite game, the values of the probability
Θ and the QoI at equilibrium shown in Figs. 12 and 13. Figs. 12 and 13 shows that the values of
Θ and the QoI of the finite IoBT game coincide with the values of the mean-field game, which
confirms the convergence of the finite game to the mean-field game for large N .
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the problem of misinformation propagation in an IoBT in
which the nodes seek to determine the optimal probability of accepting the information. We
have formulated the problem as a finite state mean-field game with multiclass agents. We have
proposed an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep algorithm to find the mean-field
equilibrium. We have analyzed the finite IoBT game and derived the conditions of convergence
of the finite IoBT game to the mean-field game as the number of nodes tends to infinity. Our
results have shown our proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the QoI compared
to the value of the baseline when the nodes are transmitting. Further, our proposed scheme can
reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared to the baseline.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Each characteristic, presented in Proposition 1, of the studied IoBT game is proven as follows:
1) The transitional rate Gjlik(αik(t),Θ(t)) is only a function of αik(t) when j = S, and, in
this case, it is a linear function of αik(t) and therefore Lipschitz in αik(t).
2) Proving that the best response α∗ik(∆luik,γ(t)) is Lipschitz in ∆luik, Θ(t), η(t) can be
shown using a similar proof as [22, Proposition 1] and using the fact the transitional rate
Gjlik(αik(t),Θ(t)) is Lipchitz in αik(t). One direct consequence is that the best response
α∗ik(∆luik,γ(t)) is Lipchitz in mik(t), ∀(i, k) ∈ C since both Θ(t) and η(t) are linear
functions of mik(t) ∀(i, k) ∈ C. However, the proof relies on the assumption that that cost
vik(l, α
l
ik(t),γ(t)) is strongly convex w.r.t α
l
ik(t).
By computing the second order partial derivative of vik with respect to αik(t),
∂2vik
∂αik(t)2
(S, αik(t),Θ(t)) = (Lik(Θ(t))(kη(t) + 1) + (kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik(t)− (1− λik)kη(t))
−Lik(Θ(t))(βLik(t)(kη(t) + 1− κδik(t))− (βEik(kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik(t)− (1− λik)kη(t)
−κδik(t)(1− Lik(Θ(t)))).
The derivative ∂
2vik
∂αik(t)2
is not necessarily positive since the second term (which corresponds
to the QoI when the node receives misinformation) could be negative. Thus, in order to
ensure that the cost is strongly convex, the values of Qik(γ(t)) are scaled such that the
resulting values are always positive. Let Q′ik(γ(t)) the scaled valued. Q
′
ik(γ(t)) can be
possibly defined as Q′ik(γ(t)) = Qik(γ(t))+Sk where Sk is the scaling factor and is given
by Sk = k + 2.
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By normalizing the QoI values, the second order partial derivative of vik with respect to
αik(t) becomes
∂2vik
∂αik(t)2
(S, αik(t),Θ(t)) = (Lik(Θ(t))(kη(t) + 1 + Sk) + (kη(t)− kΘ(t)− λik(t)− (1− λik)kη(t) + Sk)
−Lik(Θ(t))(βLik(t)(kη(t) + 1 + Sk − κδik(t))− (βEik(kη(t)− kΘ(t) + Sk − λik(t)− (1− λik)kη(t)
−κδik(t)(1− Lik(Θ(t)))).
It can be easily shown that ∂
2vik
∂αik(t)2
is lower bounded by κ = (1−βLik)(2k−1)+βEδik > 0
assuming βL ≥ βE . Hence, the cost in this case is strongly convex with parameter κ
assuming that either δik 6= 0 or βLik 6= 1.
3) In order to prove this property, we first note that the transitional rate is only a
function of αik(t) and Θ(t) only when the state is S. We consider the transitional rate
GSIik (α
S
ik(t),Θ(t))) = α
S
ik(t)Rik(Θ(t)) and compute its partial derivative with respect to
Θ(t):
∂GSIik
∂Θ(t)
(α∗ik(t),Θ(t)) =
∂
∂Θ(t)
α∗ik(t)Θ(t) = kΘ(t)
∂
∂Θ(t)
α∗ik(t) + kα
∗
ik(t). (32)
The partial derivative ∂
∂Θ(t)
α∗ik(t) is bounded since αik(t) is Lipschitz in Θ(t) according
to 2). Further, Θ(t) and αik(t) are bounded by 1. Thus,
∂G
SI
ik
∂Θ(t)
(α∗ik(t)) is bounded, and the
transitional rate GSIik is Lipschitz in Θ(t).
Further, GSIik (αik(t),Θ(t)) is a linear function of αik(t) and therefore is Lipschitz in ∆Su
since αik(t) is Lipschitz in ∆Su. This property can be proved for the remaining transitional
probabilities using a similar method.
4) The immediate cost vik and its derivative ∇αvik can be similarly proven to be Lipchitz in
Θ and η by showing that the partial derivatives with respect to Θ and η are bounded.
5) This property easily follows from 2), 3), and 4).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let WNik (l, t) = E
[
(ulik(t) − uN,n,lik (t))2
]
. Thus, WNik (t) = maxl∈SW
N
ik (l, t). To prove the
lemma, we apply Dynkin formula on functions of the process (l,nik) . First, we define the
infinitesimal generator acting on a function of the process (l,nik) ϕ : (S,N S , [0, T ])→ R as
Aikϕ(l,nik, s) =
∑
j∈S
Giklj (α
N,l
ik (s))[ϕ(j,nik(s), s)− ϕ(l,nik(s), s)]
+
∑
j∈S
∑
y∈S
nyikG
N,ik
yj (α
N,y
ik (s))[ϕ(l,nik(s) + ejy, s)− ϕ(l,nik(s), s)], (33)
where αN,yik = α
N,y∗
ik (γN(n(t)+e
ik
ly),∆yu
N,n(t)+eikly
ik ) for (i, k) 6= (i′, k′) ((i′, k′) is the class of the
reference player) and αN,yik = α
N,y∗
ik (γN(n(t) − eiky ),∆yu
N,n(t)−eiky
ik ) for (i, k) 6= (i′, k′) are the
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equilibrium acceptance probabilities for the finite IoBT game. Using Dynkin formula, we have
E[ϕ(lik(T ),nik(T ), T )− ϕ(lik(t),nik(t), t)] = E
[ ∫ T
t
dϕ
dt
(lik(s),nik(s), s) +Aikϕ(lik(s),nik(s), s)ds
]
, (34)
where lik(s) is the state of the reference player at time s.
Next, we define ϕl(j,nik(t), t) = (ulik(t)− uN,n,lik (t))2. Using (34), we have
WNik (l, t)−WNik (l, T ) = −E
[
(uN,n,lik (t)− ulik(t))2
]
+ E
[
(uN,n,lik (T )− ulik(T ))2
]
= E
∫ T
t
2(uN,n,lik (s)− ulik(s))
d
ds
(uN,n,lik (s)− ulik(s))ds+
∫ T
t
∑
jy
nyikG
N,ik
yj (α
N,y
ik (s))[ϕ(l,nik(s) + e
ik
jy, s)− ϕ(l,nik(s), s)]
= E
∫ T
t
2(uN,n,lik (s)− ulik(s))
(∑
y,j
ηlik(y, j,n)(u
N,n+eikjy,l
ik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))− h(∆luN,nik ,mN (s), l) + h(∆luik,m(s), l)ds,
+E
∫ T
t
∑
jy
nyikG
N,ik
yj (α
N,y
ik (s))(u
N,n+eikjy,l
ik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))2 − (uN,n,lik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))2),
= E
∫ T
t
∑
jy
nyikG
N,ik
yj (α
N,y
ik (s))(u
N,n+eikjy,l
ik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))2ds+ E
∫ T
t
(2(uN,n,lik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))(h(∆luik,m(s), l),
−h(∆luN,nik ,mN (s), l)ds. (35)
From Remark 2, we have
∑
jy n
y
ikG
N,ik
yj (α
N,y
ik (s))(u
N,n+ejy ,l
ik (s)−uN,n,lik (s))2 ≤ K2N . Then, since
the terminal conditions are zero, we have
WNik (t) ≤
K3
N
+ 2E
∫ T
t
(uN,n,lik (s)− uN,n,lik (s))(h(∆luik,m(s), l)− h(∆luN,nik ,mN (s))ds, (36)
where K3 = K2T . Using Proposition 1, h is Lipschitz function of ∆luik and mik(t) ∀(i, k) ∈ C.
Hence,
(h(∆luik,m(s), l)− h(∆luN,nik ,mN (s), l)) ≤ K4(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||nrv(s)
Nrv
−mrv(s)||+ ||uN,nik − uik||). (37)
Then, from (36) and (37) and using the property ab < a2 + b2, we have
WNik (t) ≤
K3
N
+K4E
∫ T
t
∑
(r,v)∈C
||nrv(s)
Nrv
−mrv(s)||2 + ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||2ds,
WNik (t) ≤
K3
N
+K4E
∫ T
t
WNik (s) +
∑
(r,v)∈C
V Nrv (s)ds,
≤ K3
N
+K4E
∫ T
t
WNik (s) +
∑
(r,v)∈C
V Nrv (s)ds,
≤ C1
N
+ C1E
∫ T
t
WNik (s) +
∑
(r,v)∈C
V Nrv (s)ds,
where C1 = max{K3, K4}. APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
By applying Dynkin’s Formula (34) with ϕl(j,nik, t) = (mlik(t) − n
l
ik(t)
Nik
)2 for all l ∈ S , we
get
V Nik (l, t)−
(νlik)(1− νlik)
2
= E
∫ t
0
dϕl
dt
(lik(s),nik(s), s) +Aikϕ
l(lik(s),nik(s), s)ds, (38)
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where dϕl
dt
(lik(s),nik(s), s) = −2
(nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)
)∑
j∈S
Gljik(α
l
ik(s))m
j
ik(s). (39)
In what follows, we replace ϕl(lik(s),nik(s), s) by ϕl(nik(s), s) since ϕl is independent on
lik(s). Therefore,
Aikϕ(lik(s),nik(s), s) =
∑
j∈S
njikG
ik
jl (α
N,j
ik (t))(ϕl(nik(s) + elj , h)− ϕl(nik(s), s))
+
∑
j 6=l
nlikG
ik
lj (α
N,l
ik (t))(ϕl(nik(s) + ejl, s)− ϕl(nik(s), s)),
=
(
2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)) +
1
Nik
)∑
j 6=l
njik(s)
Nik
GN,ikjl (α
N,j
ik (s))− (2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s))−
1
Nik
)
∑
j 6=l
nlik(s)
Nik
GN,iklj (α
N,l
ik (s)).
Now, using the property that
∑
j 6=lG
N,ik
lj (α
N,l
ik (s)) = −GN,ikll (αN,lik (s)), we have
Aikϕ(lik(s),nik(s), s) =
(
2(
nlik(s)
N
−mlik(s)) +
1
N
)∑
j 6=l
njik(s)
N
GN,iklj (α
N,l
ik (s))
+(2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s))−
1
Nik
)
nlik(s)
N
GN,ikll (α
N,l
ik (s)),
≤
(
2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)
)∑
j
njik(s)
N
GN,iklj (α
N,l
ik (s)) +
K5
Nik
, (40)
where the last equality follows since each transition rate is bounded. Thus,
V Nik (l, t) ≤ E
∫ t
0
2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s))
∑
j
(njik(s)
N
Gikjl (α
j
ik(s))−mjik(s)Gikjl (αN,jik (s))
)
+
K5
Nik
,
= E
∫ t
0
2(
nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s))
∑
j
njik(s)
Nik
(Gikjl (α
N,j
ik (s))−Gikjl (αjik(s))
+Gikjl (α
j
ik(s))((
njik(s)
Nik
−mjik(s))ds+
K6
Nik
, (41)
where K6 = K5 · T . Since in our game, the transitional rate is Lipchitz in mik(t) ∀ (i, k) and
in uik (according to Proposition 1), and using Remark 2 we have for (i, k) = (i′, k′) ((i′, k′) is
the class of the reference player)
Gikjl (α
N,j
ik (s))−Gikjl (αjik(s))
≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s) + ejl
Nrv
||) + (||uN,n+e
ik
jl
ik (s)− uik||),
≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) + 2
Nrv
+ (||uN,n+e
ik
jl
ik (s)− uN,nik (s)||+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||),
≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) + 2 + 2K8
Nrv
+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||. (42)
Also, for (i, k) 6= (i′, k′), we have
Gikjl (α
N,j
ik (s))−Gikjl (αjik(s))
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≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)− el
Nrv
||) + (||uN,n+ejlik (s)− uik||),
≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv
Nrv
(s)||) + 1
Nrv
+ (||uN,n−eiklik (s)− uN,nik (s)||+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||),
≤ K7(
∑
(r,v)∈C
|||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) + 2 + 2K8
Nrv
+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||. (43)
By substituting (43) into (41), we get
V Nik (l, t) ≤ 2K7E
∫ t
0
|n
l
ik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)|
(
(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) + K9
Nrv
+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||
)
ds
+E
∫ t
0
2
(nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)
)∑
j
Gikjl (αik(t))
(njik(s)
Nik
−mjik(s)
)
ds+
K6
N
,
≤ 2K7E
∫ t
0
|n
l
ik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)|
(
(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) + K10
Nrv
+ ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||
)
ds,
+K9E
∫ t
0
2
∣∣∣nlik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)
∣∣∣∑
j
∣∣∣njik(s)
Nik
−mjik(s)
∣∣∣ds, (44)
where K10 = K6 + 2T (1 +K7) +K9. Let (y, z) = argmax(r,v)||mrv(s)− nrv(s)Nrv ||. Thus,
|n
l
ik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)|
(
(
∑
(r,v)∈C
||mrv(s)− nrv(s)
Nrv
||) ≤
∑
(r,v)∈C
||myz(s)− nyz(s)
Nyz
||2,
≤ |C|||myz(s)− nyz(s)
Nrv
||2, (45)|n
l
ik(s)
Nik
−mlik(s)|.||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)|| ≤ ||
nik(s)
Nik
−mik(s)||.||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||,
≤ ||nik(s)
Nik
−mik(s)||2 + ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||2. (46)
From (44), (45), and (46), we have
V Nik (l, t) ≤ K11E
∫ t
0
||nik(s)
Nik
−mik(s)||2 + ||uN,nik (s)− uik(s)||2 + ||
nyz(s)
Nyz
−myz(s)||2 + K10
Nmax
,
(47)
where K11 = 2K7 +K9 and Nmax = max(r,v) Nrv. Thus,
V Nik (t) ≤ C2E
∫ t
0
(V Nik (s) +W
N
ik (s) + V
N
yz (s))ds+
C2
Nmax
, (48)
with C2 = max{K11, K10}.
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